A response to a
comment by Paul Barford
Raimund Karl and Katharina
Möller
In a series of reactions on his blog (see here
and here),
Paul Barford (and a commentator)
have questioned the results our study “An
empirical examination of metal detecting”. Yet, apparently, they both have seriously
misunderstood the point of our paper. Much like Sam Hardy (see “Estimating
numbers?”) they seem to not understand the difference between comparing
data of the same kind for the purpose of deductive hypothesis-testing and
'estimating' numbers of metal detectorists based on different kinds of data;
and why such hypothesis-testing is needed for coming up with better solutions
for regulating metal detecting than archaeology, as a profession in general,
seems to have come up with as of yet.
Thus, also as further explanation, we would like, in the
following, to respond to these comments. Not that we believe it will help Paul
Barford, since it is our feeling that he has long dug himself into too deep a
hole to be able to get out again; or even see the need to stop shovelling.
Rather, it hopefully will allow somewhat more open-minded readers to better
understand why our results, and the conclusions we have drawn and actions we
have taken based on them, are both helpful and suitable to move forward the
debate on how to best regulate metal detecting; and possibly even to find more
effective solutions for actually doing so.
Comparing data, rather than ‘estimates’
In contrast to what Barford and the commentator (the latter
quoting from Hardy’s study) seem to think, we do not say anywhere in our paper
that there were only 7,331 active detectorists in the UK as of 2/3/2015. We say
that on 2/3/2015, 7,331 was the number of subscribers to the largest internet
discussion board for metal detecting in the UK. This is a factually correct
statement, because that was what the figure was on that day. It is data.
We also collected the membership figures of German and
Austrian discussion boards on the same date. That is also data.
Establishing transnational comparability
We believe that it is rather important to use exactly the
same kind of data in transnational comparisons, so that it can be directly
compared; and also reasonably controlled for differences in data quality.
The membership lists of boards usually contain at least
some, if not much, additional information on members in data tables. This data,
for instance, allows to compare the chronological development of membership
figures between different boards; allows to determine the percentage of active
members (who post to the board) and passive ones (who only read, or may have
only joined and read something once and then never returned); and whether a
board is occasionally removing long-term inactive members. The latter, for
instance, can be demonstrated for the largest German board: the sum total of
posts registered since its inception exceeds the sum total of posts by active subscribers
(as last calculated from data from its member list on 5/3/2016) by c. 4% (ca.
35.000 posts in absolute numbers); clearly demonstrating that, at least
occasionally, even formerly active subscribers have been purged from it.
Similarly, the largest British board had 11,560 subscribers as of 2/4/2017, but
only 9,059 as of 11/3/2018, indicating a relatively recent purge of c. 2,500
‘inactive’ subscribers. All this makes it possible to control the data for independent
variables which may affect its transnational comparability.
Other social media, on the other hand, do not normally
provide, or make it very difficult to access, such data on their members,
making it difficult, if not impossible, to control transnational data
comparability. Also, other social media are completely differently structured
than discussion boards and thus not only are likely to attract somewhat
different segments of the overall population of metal detectorists in a
country, but to also be used at least somewhat differently, thus catering to
different needs of the metal detecting community.
Thus, it seems to us that using data from other social
media, e.g. from Facebook metal detecting groups (as the commentator on
Barford’s blog suggests we should have done, because the largest UK Facebook
Group for metal detecting has many more members than the largest UK discussion
board) would compromise transnational data comparability too much to allow for
a rigorous transnational comparison. Comparing such different kinds of social
media data would be like the proverbial comparison between apples and oranges:
certainly possible, but not necessarily very meaningful.
The premises of the transnational data comparison
None of the data we collected is the actual number of metal
detectorists in each of the countries we compared, nor is it the minimum number
of people engaging in this activity. We do not know what fraction of the
overall population of metal detectorists each of these membership numbers are,
nor do we have any reliable means to establish what fraction they are. We thus
do not produce any 'estimates' for the total number of active metal
detectorists in each country from those membership figures. Such ‘estimates’
would not be data, but – however well informed – guesses. Comparing guesses
transnationally may be an interesting mind-game, but it is not an empirical
study.
Thus, rather than comparing ‘estimates’, to produce an
empirical examination of the relative sizes of metal detecting communities in
different countries, we compare the data we collected directly. This is based
on a premise (an assumption) we
explain in our paper: that these membership figures (particularly of the
largest board in each country) represent, at least roughly, similar fractions
of the overall number of active metal detectorists in each of them.
If that assumption is correct, the data is directly
comparable transnationally, because of the simple fact that the ratio between
two unknown numbers X and Y, which each represent (at least roughly) the same
fraction F of two known figures A and B, will always be (roughly) the same as
the ratio between A and B. The mathematical formula for this is:
X : Y = (A/F) :
(B/F)
Is this premise reasonable?
As with any assumption, this premise may, of course, be
false; and we can happily discuss whether that is the case (as Barford,
somewhat awkwardly, attempts here).
So if anyone is interested in having a rational debate about whether it is
false or at least sufficiently verisimilar (‘true-ish’) to serve as a first
approximation, we can happily have that debate.
For the purpose of our paper, we have assumed that this
assumption is at least verisimilar enough to allow to directly compare the data
for the purpose of a first approximation of the relative sizes (whatever they
might actually be in absolute numbers) of the metal detecting communities in
the compared countries. We believe this assumption to be sufficiently verisimilar
not least because of the results of our examination of the data itself: that,
per capita, Germany has about thrice as many subscribers to the largest
national discussion board, and Austria about twice as many, as Britain.
This means for even only achieving parity in the per capita
size of the metal detecting communities in Germany and Britain, one would have
to assume that at least thrice as large a fraction of the German metal
detecting community has subscribed to the largest German national board as has
in Britain. So, assuming – for the sake of this argument – Britain had about
22.000 active metal detectorists on 2/3/2015, and that just 33% of that
community – that is the 7.331 subscribers we found – had subscribed to the
largest British board, 100% of all active German metal detectorists would have
had to have subscribed to the largest German board to achieve per capita parity
of metal detecting community sizes.
However, it is actually quite unlikely that the largest German
board represents a full 100% of the German metal detecting community. As we
have demonstrated in our paper, there are several other sizeable German boards
for metal detecting. Therefore, for the largest German board to represent all
active German metal detectorists, members would have had to subscribe to both
the largest and at least one other of the somewhat smaller, but still sizeable
boards. While there will be some overlap, this seems rather improbable. Rather,
there will be some fraction of them who have only subscribed to one of those
smaller, but still sizeable boards. And we would hazard to guess that there are
at least some who haven’t subscribed to any such board. Thus, in all
likelihood, the membership of the largest German board is less than 100 % of
all active German metal detectorists.
So, let us assume for the sake of this argument that the
largest German board has only been subscribed to by c. two thirds of all active
German metal detectorists. That would, incidentally, mean that on 2/3/2015,
there would have been – approximately – 45.000 active metal detectorists in
Germany. For achieving parity per capita in terms of numbers of metal
detectorists between Germany and Britain, that would require us to assume that
the 7.331 subscribers to the largest British board on 2/3/2015 only represented
c. 20% of all active British metal detectorists. That, in turn, would mean that
on 2/3/2015, there would actually have been c. 36,500 active British metal
detectorists (which of course would be entirely possible, but is already a
number which is larger than most current estimates).
How much data bias is required for reversing the results?
To support the idea that restrictive regulation is more
effective than liberal regulation in reducing the number of metal detectorists
active in a country, our data would need to show the opposite of what it actually
does. Ideally, it would need to show (at least) something like, say, that there
are twice as many subscribers per capita for the largest British board than for
the largest German one.
To get to this result by arguing that our data is so biased
that it seems to show the opposite of what actually is the case, one would need
to assume that while almost every active German metal detectorist has
subscribed to the largest German board, hardly any active British metal
detectorist has: say, 100% of all German metal detectorists, but only c. 15% of
all British ones having subscribed to the largest national board in their
country. That would mean that there would have had to have been c. 49.000
active metal detectorists in Britain on 2/3/2015. Of course, that may have been
the case, but it increasingly widens the gap between the available evidence and
the necessary assumptions to maintain the hypothesis: it starts to put data
into the straight-jacket of theory.
It only gets worse if one assumes – as one has to – that the
largest German board is not actually subscribed to by every single active
German metal detectorist. If, say, only 66% of all active German metal
detectorists should be subscribed to the largest German board, then only 10% of
the active British metal detectorists can have subscribed to the largest
British board to maintain a ratio of 2 British to 1 German metal detectorists
per capita. That would mean that on 2/3/2015, there would have had to have been
c. 75,000 active metal detectorists in Britain (and indeed, that there would
now be slightly more than 90,000 as of 11/3/2018, given that at that date, the
largest British board had 9,059 subscribers).
Point being: for the results of our data comparison to show
the reverse of the actual per capita ratio of metal detecting community sizes
in Germany and Britain, there would need to be an exceptionally substantial
data bias.
What is the expected direction of bias in our data?
Such a substantial data bias is quite unlikely, particularly
in the direction it would need to be biasing the data to pervert our results
into the very opposite of what is really the case. There are at least two good
reasons for why fewer active metal detectorists should be subscribing to German
boards than British ones:
Firstly, IP addresses are traceable to their origin. That
should not constitute any issue in Britain, where metal detecting is hardly regulated
at all: there is no risk associated for the ordinary metal detectorist with
subscribing to a board. In Germany, on the other hand, most state heritage
agencies insist that all metal detecting is strictly prohibited without a
permit and punishable with up to half a Million Euro, and/or two years in jail,
depending in what state one pursues this activity. And there are indeed some
archaeologists and some interested citizens subscribed to German metal
detecting boards who do report offences they find evidence for on these boards (or
elsewhere on the internet) to the authorities, which has already resulted in
several successful prosecutions (e.g. most recently in the case of the “Barbarenschatz
von Rülzheim”, which ended with a conviction of the looter for embezzlement
under § 246 of German Penal Law). Thus, subscribing to a board for this
activity in Germany carries at least some risk for metal detectorists of
exposing themselves to prosecution, if not a considerably risk.
And secondly, while nearly every native German speaker also
speaks and reads English as their second language; only a small percentage of
Brits speaks and reads German. Thus, there are quite some native German metal
detectorists subscribed to some of the British metal detecting boards; while
hardly any British metal detectorists are subscribed to German boards.
Thus, statistically speaking, membership figures of British
boards should be considerably inflated compared to those of German ones; that
is, represent a greater fraction of the metal detectorist population in Britain
than the membership figures of German boards do of the German metal detectorist
population. Thus, if the metal detecting communities in Britain and Germany
were actually of exactly the same size per capita of the total population of
these two countries, our data should – falsely because of the expected bias –
appear to show more metal detectorists per capita in Britain than in Germany.
Yet, our data shows the very opposite of this; in fact, it deviates very
significantly from parity in the other direction than the one it should due to
the expected data bias.
Falsifying hypotheses, rather than explaining data away
Thus, while it is of course not impossible that the
assumption we used in our study for comparing our data directly is false, it
must be considered quite unlikely that it is so significantly false as to have
reversed our results to show the opposite of what actually is the case. A very
good explanation for such a massive and unexpected data bias would be required;
and at least as far as we can see at this point in time, there is not even a
sliver of evidence that suggest that such a massive bias in the data exists.
Even if one accepts a shift in internet use by British metal
detectorists from boards to facebook, as Barford has suggested,
there is not much evidence that the same isn’t happening in Germany and Austria.
Barford just proposes that that shift in the UK serves to explain the
difference; but without demonstrating that there is no comparable shift in
Germany. Yet, even a quick search for only one of the many potential terms that
could be used to find facebook groups for German metal detectorists – that of
“Sondler” – produces the maximum number of 100 search results that Facebook
shows. Naturally, many of the groups turned up have only a few subscribers or
even only one, but there also are many with over a 1,000 members each; with one
as of 16/3/2018 (at 9:19 GMT) having had 18,381 members. And that is not even
considering that more of our German than our British facebook friends are
subscribed to the UK metal detecting facebook group referenced in the comment
on Barford’s blog, while none of our British facebook friends have subscribed to
any of the German metal detecting facebook groups that we are also members of.
Similarly, Barford’s argument that the “two biggest UK 'boards' (sic) formed in opposition to each other”
due to “a shift in policy on what was
then the biggest forum, and many members left (some were expelled) and other
forums were set up” also fails to explain the discrepancy in our data
between the UK and Germany. After all, there are a full three German boards
with larger, and another two with almost as large per capita memberships as the
biggest two British boards. These also formed as results of splits in the
German metal detecting community, which led to members leaving (or being
expelled from) what was then (and still is) the biggest German board, leading
to (the) other forums being set up. Thus, the fact that the second largest
British board was formed in opposition to the first is not particularly
suitable to explain the data we collected, but only an attempt – and at that a
not too well-founded one – to explain the data away. This fact, thus, also does
not support the suggestion that our results would be explicable by the massive
data bias that would have to be assumed to invalidate our results.
That, in turn, means that the data and premise we used seem
sufficient for the purpose we used them for: after all, we wanted to test the hypothesis
that restrictive regulation of metal detecting is more effective than more
liberal regulation in reducing the number of persons who take up this activity.
For that hypothesis to be true, the number of metal detectorists per capita
active in countries with more restrictive regulations should be considerably
lower than in countries with more liberal, or indeed hardly any, regulation of
that activity, as is the case in Britain.
Thus, to demonstrate that this hypothesis is false, it was
entirely sufficient for us to demonstrate that the per capita numbers of metal
detectorists active in countries with restrictive regulation of metal
detecting, like Germany or Austria, are roughly the same as in ‘liberal’
countries like Britain. Yet, in fact, the data we compared doesn’t show that,
in all likelihood, there are roughly similar per capita numbers of metal
detectorists who seem to be active in the three countries we compared. Rather,
our data seems to show that the size of the metal detecting community in Germany
(however big it may actually be), the most restrictive of the three countries
compared in terms of how metal detecting is regulated, seems to be considerably
larger than that of this community in Britain, the most liberal one; with
Austria sitting somewhere in the middle between the other two.
Thus, the data we compared would seem to indicate that the
very opposite ratio of community sizes exists than should were the hypothesis
we tested be true. Thus, we concluded that (at least for the time being, as is
always the case in academic endeavours) the hypothesis that restrictive
regulation of metal detecting is more effective at reducing the number of
active metal detectorists than more liberal regulatory regimes would have to be
considered to have been falsified.
The thrust of our argument
Paul Barford, in his first blog
post, also fundamentally misunderstands what we were trying to achieve with
our study; perhaps because he is looking at the matter from a British
perspective (despite living in Poland), while we are looking at the matter from
an Austrian and German perspective (despite living in Britain). He seems to
mistakenly believe that we are arguing against (restrictive) regulation of
metal detecting; while in fact, we are not.
In fact, we both are for
regulating metal detecting; and neither of us believes that the approach taken
in Britain of hardly regulating the activity at all is a sensible approach. We
believe that sensible regulation of this activity is both desirable and
necessary; not just for the good of archaeology, but, equally importantly, also
for the good of the metal detectorists. The question for us, thus, is not whether metal detecting should be
regulated; but only how it should
best be regulated.
Rational inquiry into the efficacy of existing regulation
But for finding a sensible approach to regulating metal
detecting – and with sensible we mean one that minimises the damage caused by
this activity as much as possible, and at the same time maximises its potential
benefits (of which there certainly are some, if perhaps not as many as it – at
least currently – causes in terms of avoidable damage) – one needs to first
conduct rational and unbiased studies of the efficacy of existing regulatory
approaches, rather than just banging on about it being wrong to have no
regulation of metal detecting at all. Banging on about it being wrong may be emotionally
satisfying and a suitable othering for the benefit of archaeological identity
politics; but it seems rather unlikely – as past experience shows – that it
will produce any meaningful success for minimizing the damage caused and
maximising the potential benefits that might be derived from this activity if
it is properly regulated.
It is particularly at this point that the ‘germanophone’
perspective that we take comes in: in our respective home countries, many, if
not most, professional archaeologists and archaeological heritage managers seem
to believe that we are in need of even tighter, even more restrictive
regulation with even more possibilities to punish metal detectorists for doing
what they do (see for this e.g. “Schärfere
Gesetze für die Denkmalpflege?”), despite already having very restrictive
regulation of this activity. But for this approach – which is the approach
‘germanophone’ archaeological heritage management has consistently taken for
the past c. 50 years, that is, since metal detectors became widely available in
our countries – to work, the hypothesis must be true that more restrictive
regulation is more effective at reducing the numbers of active metal
detectorists than less restrictive regulation.
If it isn’t – and our work, most recently in both “An
empirical examination of metal detecting” and “Schärfere
Gesetze für die Denkmalpflege?”, seems to demonstrate that, indeed, it is
not – then any success that we may achieve in getting even more restrictive
regulations on the book will not do us any good. Rather, it will only have even
more unintended and unwanted side-effects than the regulations we already have
already do.
Unwanted side-effects of restrictive regulation as in Austria and Germany
And that they do have such unwanted side-effects is proven
beyond any reasonable doubt by the fact that, despite all German and Austrian
heritage laws having provisions making reporting of any archaeological find
compulsory, regardless of the circumstances of its discovery, under threat of
severe punishment, finds are not only much less frequently reported anywhere in
Austria and Germany than they are to the PAS in England and Wales; but are
being reported less frequently than they were before more restrictive
regulations were introduced in the last few decades, despite a constant rise in
the number of active metal detectorists over the same period.
That, of course, must not be misunderstood as an argument
against compulsory and for voluntary reporting schemes (like the PAS), because
it is neither intended as such, nor would such an argument hold water: it is
just stating an inconvenient truth.
After all, the very point of legally compulsory finds
reporting is to increase rather than decrease the number of finds that have
actually been made being reported to the authorities. In Austria, in fact, this
is the explicit intent of the legislator since (at least) 1846, when it was clearly
expressed in the context of the state giving up its one-third ownership share
in finds of treasure (Frodl 1988, 34; most recently discussed in greater detail
in Karl et al. 2017) to encourage the reporting of archaeological finds. Thus,
if in countries with voluntary reporting systems, many more finds are being
reported than in such with compulsory ones, something must be amiss in the
latter countries.
Given that it can be clearly demonstrated that the reporting
figures considerably declined in Austria as a consequence of making metal
detecting regulations much more restrictive than before in 1990 and again in 1999,
by as much as 75% (Karl 2012, 105) compared to immediately before, it seems
rather likely that the cause for not reporting them is the way in which metal
detecting is being regulated. Thus, it would seem that these new and – at least
allegedly, from an archaeological perspective – ‘improved’ regulations for
preventing the occurrence of metal detecting (so, explicitly, the then head of
archaeology at the Austrian National Heritage Agency, Dr. Christa Farka, quoted
in Szemethy 2004, 160) achieved, as its only effect, that – as seems to have
surprised Farka – “the legally compulsory
finds reports are not submitted” (ibid.), while the number of active metal
detectorists has continued to rise unabatedly. Thus, the legal prohibition of
metal detecting seems to have had the unintended and unwelcome side-effect to
subvert the will of the legislator (as first clearly expressed in 1812 and
repeated numerously since) that archaeological finds be reported.
A mitigated problem or an unmitigated disaster?
But if there are such unwanted side-effects, it becomes
absolutely essential to empirically test whether restrictive regulation has the
effect desired by many, if not most, germanophone archaeologists (and indeed the
germanophone legislatures); and that is what we set out to do, and still
believe to have achieved, in our paper.
After all, if restrictive regulation reduces, not the number
of finds being extracted ex situ unprofessionally, but instead – and that
considerably – the incidence of finds that have been made being reported, it
also removes any ‘extraction ex situ damage’-mitigating effect that reporting has.
And finds reporting must have such a damage-mitigating effect, however small it
may be in any individual case: after all, if it had not, why bother with making
archaeological finds reporting compulsory at all? Thus, restrictive regulations
of the kind that Austria and the German states have – in this regard –
increases the damage caused by unprofessional extraction of archaeology ex situ.
That, again, is just stating an inconvenient truth, not an argument for no
regulation.
However, that inconvenient truth makes it all the more
important that restrictive regulations do, in fact, reduce the actual incidence
of metal detecting; that is: reduce the number of archaeological objects
‘hoiked’ out of the ground. Because if restrictive regulation does not reduce
the incidence of metal detecting compared to more liberal (or indeed no)
regulation (whatsoever), it does not reduce the damage caused by the
unprofessional extraction of archaeology ex situ at all.
That, in turn, makes testing the hypothesis that restrictive
regulations like the ones existing in Austria and the German states absolutely
crucial. After all, if that hypothesis does not hold true, only their
detrimental effects on reporting are achieved, but not the beneficial effects
of the hypothetically predicted reduction in the damage actually caused by the
extraction of archaeology ex situ. Or, in somewhat harsher words: if that
hypothesis does not hold true, a problem which could at least have somewhat
been mitigated by a different approach to regulating metal detecting turns into
a truly unmitigated disaster due to the regulatory approach chosen.
An argument for what kind of regulation?
Sadly, the results of our study seem to show that
restrictive regulation – at the very least of the kind that exists in Austria
and the German states – does not have the hypothetically predicted and desired effect
of reducing the incidence of metal detecting (also see Szemethy 2004, 160, in
case of doubt that this is the effect which was desired by – at least – Farka) compared
to more liberal regimes of regulating metal detecting.
That, however, is not by us and should not be misunderstood by
others as an argument for no (or even only ‘liberal’) regulation: after all,
our paper neither set out to nor did prove that liberal regulation is more
effective than restrictive regulation in reducing the number of active metal
detectorists in a country. That was never its scope: we did not test the data
for whether liberal regulation is more effective than restrictive regulation in
reducing the incidence of metal detecting; since that would have required us to
proceed entirely differently than we did.
We also never argued in our paper that we were testing
whether more restrictive or more liberal regulation of metal detecting is more
effective at suppressing the incidence of metal detecting. Rather, as we
explicitly concluded in the German version of our paper, we believe both
restrictive and liberal regulatory regimes to be equally ineffective at achieving the effect desired by so many a
germanophone (and not just germanophone) archaeologist. What we concluded is
that neither significantly reduces the number of active metal detectorists in a
country; but that the size of the respective national metal detecting
communities is determined – virtually entirely – by utterly different, and as
yet largely unknown or insufficiently understood, other variables.
If that conclusion were true, that has consequences as to
how we approach regulating metal detecting; and especially that we need to
approach it differently than we have before.
How to differently (and hopefully more effectively) regulate metal detecting?
How we believe regulating metal detecting could be
approached differently to hopefully achieve more effectively what we intend to
achieve, the Austrian author of this paper has indeed recently outlined in his proposal
for changes to Austrian heritage law. He has discussed these in German in a very condensed manner in “Ein Vorschlag für neue
archäologische Denkmalschutzbestimmungen für Österreich”.
That proposal, to provide an even shorter English summary,
includes a compulsory recording and reporting requirement for all
archaeological finds, regardless of the circumstances of their discovery. Thus,
the thrust of our argument, in case that anyone still believes we are for
entirely voluntary reporting, is not, and never has been, that regulation of
metal detecting should be entirely abolished and a ‘British’, nearly entirely
voluntary system, of finds reporting be introduced.
But that proposal also suggests to largely abolish the universal
permit requirement currently contained in the Austrian (and most German)
‘archaeological fieldwork’ regulations (because the legal provisions used in
these countries for regulating metal detecting do not just apply to metal
detecting, but any archaeological fieldwork) that hardly any metal detectorist
appears to be complying with or be concerned about. This, again, is not because
we are for ‘anything goes’ where metal detecting is concerned, either; but
because we recognise the sad reality that the restrictive permit regime as is
currently in place is utterly counter-productive: it achieves the opposite of
what it intends to achieve. Thus, the Austrian permit regime in its current
form must go, because persisting with a regulation that demonstrably achieves
the opposite of what it intends to achieve, to the detriment of the
archaeology, is madness, plain and simple.
What was proposed instead is regulation which links the
legality of any archaeological finds recovery with the competence by which it
is conducted: if done competently (which naturally requires its proper
recording and reporting), it is legal; if done incompetently, it is punishable
by law.
To encourage actual compliance by as many involved parties
as possible, it was proposed to also link legal extraction of archaeology (as
just defined) directly with the acquisition of exclusive legal ownership in any
finds made (with a possibility for the state to compulsorily purchase
significant finds). If a find was extracted with such competence that the
extraction was legal, the finder gets to own it. If it was extracted
incompetently and thus illegally, ownership of it falls to the state. The
acquisition of full legal ownership of finds competently extracted ex situ
(also see on this “Against
retention in situ” for the reasons why this is actually beneficial from the
perspective of long-term archaeological data preservation) by their finders
provides positive encouragement for metal detectorists to acquire and apply the
skills necessary for legal extraction of archaeology. The acquisition of ownership
of finds legally extracted thus provides the carrot.
Combined with a central finds register also proposed, this
way of regulating the matter would also allow the state to confiscate any
archaeological find that it becomes aware of which hasn’t been properly
recorded and reported at the point of its discovery. This would make it much
easier to execute the already existing provision in Austrian heritage
protection law that illegally recovered finds fall to the state. This provision
currently can hardly ever be enforced: under current regulations, a permit is
only required if the finder conducted fieldwork with the intent to discover
archaeology, and this intent is nearly impossible to prove in almost all cases;
especially if the finder is not caught in flagrante. Under the newly proposed
regulations, on the other hand, any find that isn’t on the central register
could be confiscated without any further ado, wherever it was discovered by the
authorities (and be it only on EBay). That would provide the archaeological
authorities with a stick.
Actual ‘archaeological excavations’, that is, any research
with the purpose of discovering archaeology requiring changes to the ground
(whether above or under water) exceeding certain dimensions (somewhat
simplified: of more than 1 m3), would still require an
‘archaeological’ permit under the proposal; as indeed would – in contrast to
the current situation, where this is not the case – any other change to the
ground exceeding those dimensions for whatever reasons. Recording and reporting
of archaeology under such circumstances would also require compliance with
considerably higher (fully professional) standards; thus improving considerably
the currently rather dreadful protection of archaeology from development in
Austria. Naturally, this permit requirement for ‘substantial groundworks’ would
also apply to metal detectorists, as it equally would to everyone else who
wants to dig any larger-sized hole into the ground.
We would argue that such a kind of regulation of metal
detecting (and indeed any other archaeologically relevant activity), has a much
better chance than both the currently existing restrictive regulations in
Austria and Germany, and the liberal ones in Britain, to achieve the desired
effect: that damage to the archaeology by its extraction is minimised as much
as possible, and the potential benefits of its recovery maximised.
And we would definitely argue that it stands a much better
chance to achieve that effect than shouting insults at the ‘evil looters’ at
the top of one’s voice on a blog that most metal detectorists have never even
heard of, most of those who have wouldn’t take seriously anyway, and which
won’t change a dot about public opinion regarding the ‘evils’ of looting
archaeological sites.
Conclusion
Thus, if Barford argues, as he does, that we “seem not to see what the actual issue is”,
he is missing the point we are making and misinterpreting entirely the thrust
of our argument. Because we, exactly as he, think the issue is “regulation, both of the activity of
artefact hunting, proper documentation of assignment of ownership of finds and
regulation of the movement of artefacts on the collectors' market”. The
question is not whether to try to, but only how to achieve that aim.
We believe that the way to achieve this aim is by coming up
with reasonable solutions, that at least have a minimal chance of achieving the
aim that we, at least as much as Barford, would actually like to achieve.
Creating even only reasonable suggestions for potentially effective solutions,
however, first requires – at least in our opinion – a self-critical assessment
of our laws, policies and practices, based on sound empirical assessment of
reality. Because, to put it bluntly, what we have been trying for the past 50
years seems to not only have failed to work as intended, but indeed seems to
have made matters worse than they would have had to be. If we do not learn from
our, and indeed refuse to even only consider that we have made any, mistakes
over the last 50 years – and we would argue that we have made many and grievous
mistakes – we will continue to do more harm than good.
If we, as a profession, truly wish to do what we constantly
argue we do – that is, protect the archaeology from preventable harm and
preserve and academically study it for the benefit of all of humanity – we need
to start to act like the competent academics we are supposed to be. That, as is
expected of all competent academics, means to first dispassionately and
critically examine empirical data and draw rational conclusions from it; to
then come up with reasonable solutions to real-world problems. That is what we
intended to achieve with our research, and believe – at least until we are
convinced otherwise by rational arguments better than ours – to actually have
achieved.
If Barford (or indeed anyone else) wishes to disagree with
our conclusions and proposals derived (ultimately) from them, or the data,
methods and/or assumptions we used to arrive at them, he is of course welcome
to do so. But if he wishes to convince us, or indeed anyone who happens to want
to find rational, effective solutions to the metal detecting problem, that will
require him (or anyone else who wishes to) to come up with rational arguments
that actually pertain to ours and disprove them. Just claiming our results are
wrong just because he doesn’t like them, and try to explain our data away,
without even having bothered to properly understand what we are actually saying,
will not.
More importantly, however: if Barford believes to have a
better proposal than the one that we have recently made in Austria, he is
welcome to present them here. We would be most interested to see how his
constructive suggestions differ from ours, and are happy to change our views at
any time if he can convince us of his proposals.
We would particularly like to hear them because, sadly, we as
yet have been unable to find any actual suggestions on his blog as to what kind
of regulation of metal detecting would, in his opinion, work better than both
the failed Austrian and German restrictive, and the almost equally suboptimal
English and Welsh liberal system of regulating metal detecting. Other than, of
course, as he says in his conclusion
to his first response to our paper,
“that Collection-Driven Exploitation of
the archaeological record should lose the mantle of social acceptability that
it has”, which is just yet another aim. Thus, any rational and well-argued
answer to the question, here as above, not as to whether, but how, to achieve
this aim, that Paul Barford could provide, would be welcome.
Bibliography
Frodl, W. 1988. Idee und Verwirklichung. Das Werden der staatlichen Denkmalpflege in
Österreich. Wien:
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Karl, R. 2012. Der Weg zur Hölle ist mit guten
Vorsätzen gepflastert. Archäologische Denkmalpflege und die ungeliebte
Öffentlichkeit in Österreich. Archäologische Informationen
35, 99-111.
Karl, S., Koch, I., Pieler, E. 2017. Revidierung der gesetzlichen
Vorschriften zu archäologischen Funden und Schätzen in der österreichischen
Monarchie zwischen 1834 und 1846. Mit einem Ausblick auf die heutige Situation. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Kunst- und Denkmalpflege LXXI/1,
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Szemethy, H.D. 2004. Zur Situation der
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